Abstracts of Recent American Decisions by Editors,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
But the general rule does not apply where the order of commitment is
inade by a tribunal or officer having no jurisdiction to make it; and
the proviso of the fourteenth section of the Judiciary Act has been greatly
modified. The benefit of the writ may now be had by prisoners in jail,
not. only when in custody under authority of the United States, but in
1833, when the nullification proceedings were adopted in South Caro-
lina, it was extended to those in custody for an act done in pursuance
of a law of the United States, or of a judgment of any of its courts;
in 1842, when the complications growing out of the McLeod case and
the Canada rebellion occurred, it was extended to foreigners acting
under the authority and sanction of their own government; and in more
recent times it has been extended to all persons in custody in violation
of the Constitution or a law or treaty of th6 United States. The
present case belongs to the last category, arid is relieved from the im-
pediment to the use of a habeas corpus, which formerly existed where
the prisoner was committed under state authority; whilst the want of
jurisdiction in the state court removes any impedruient arising from the
general rule, which discountenances its use where the prisoner has been
regularly convicted and sentenced.
The order of discharge must be affirmed.
NoT.-The prisoner was thereupon discharged, but was immediately arrested
upon a bench warrant from the United States court in Savannah.
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ARBITRATION.
Of Public Interest by Officer.-Where the law imposes a personal
duty upon an officer in relation to a matter of public interest, lie cannot
delegate to others, and therefore such officer cannot submit such mat-
ters to arbitration : Mann v. Richardson, 66 Ill.
ASSUMPSIT.
Parent and Child- Care and Stpport qf Parent-Imtplied Pomise -
Where a parent resides in the family of a child, there is no implied
contract on the part of the parent to pay for services rendered, or for
I From I-Ion. N. L. Freeman, Reporter ; to appear in 66 Illinois Reports.
2 From J. B. Black, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 48 Indiana Reports.
s From Hoyt Post, Esq., Reporter; cases decided at February and April Terms
1875.
4 From E. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 25 Ohio State Reports.
5 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 76 Pennsylvania Reports.
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board, lodging or clothing supplied ; but a liability may arise from an
express contract, or a contract to pay may be intlerred from circum-
stances. The relationship rebuts tle presumption which exists in other
cases that compensation was intended, and the circumstances must be
such as to overcome the presumption which arises from the relationship
of the parties : Smith et al. v. Denman, 48 Ind.
Work and Labor.-Where one has entered into a special contract to
perform work for another, and has done the work. but not in tile time
or manner stipulated by the contract, if the work done is accepted and
used by the other party, the latter is answerable to the amount lie is
benefited upon an implied promise to pay for the value he has received:
Adams v. Cosby, 48 Ind.
By the terms of a special building contract payment for work and
materials was to be made only on the presentation of the architect's
certificate of' the quality and value of the work done and materials fur-
nished in accordance with the contract; suit was brought by the con-
tractor, not on the special contract, but on a quantum meruit. Hehl,
that, to maintain such suit, it was not necessary to procure a certificate
from the architect : .1d.
MJt'iver of Tort-leading.-Melick employed Satterlee to saw logs
into lumber; Satterlee delivered to MNelick less lumber than tle logs
produced; there was no evidence of conversion by Satterlee. Held,
that Melick could not recover in assumpsit on the common counts for
the deficiency: Satterlee v. felick, 76 Pa.
The court charged : that as bailee, Satterlee was bound to exercise
such care of the property as a prudent man takes of his own property,
and if for want of it the lumber was lost, lie would be liable ; that the
deficiency made aprimafacie ease and put Satterlee on proof of care.
Hield to be error, the action not being in case and there being no count
on a contract to keep as bailee 
: Id.
Generally where there is evidence of conversion by a wrongdoer, the
plaintiff may waive the tort and sue in assumpsit 
: 11.
To recover in such case on a count for goods sold, &c., there must be
fraud or unfair dealing, or other circumstances from which an implica-
tion may arise under such a count: Id.
BAILMENT.
Degree of Care.-A bailce taking a carriage to repair for pay, is only
held to the exercise of ordinary care, as the contract in such case is one
of mutual benefit, and when such carriage is destroyed by a fire Whieh
no ordinary prudence could guard against or prevent, the bailee will not
be responsible for the loss, even though he was detaining the same fbr
indebtedness of the owner to him ; Russell v. Koelder, 66 Ill.
BARRATRY. See Insurance.
BiLLS AND NOTES. See Partnership.
lNote for Patent Right.-The Act of May 4th 1869, regulating the
execution and transfer of notes "given for patent rights," rlates only
to the instruments named in the act, when given for an interest in the
invention, secured to a patentee by letters patent, and does not include
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in its provisions negotiable paper given for machines built under letters
patent, nor negotiable paper given to secure the agency to sell machines
so built, in certain specified territory: State of Ohio v. Pcck, 25 Ohio.
Payable in Bank -nocent Hohler-Fraudulent Representations.-
In an action by an innocent endorsee on a notpayable in a bank in this
state, it is no defence that the execution of the note was procured by
fraudulent representations: Strough et al. v. Gear et al., 48 Ind.
Where a note payable in a bank in this state, and an agreement by
which the note was payable on conditions, were executed at the same
time, and the agreement was not attached to or so referred to in the
note as to be a part of it, and the payee endorsed the note to a party
who had no knowledge or notice of the agreement, and subsequently the
payee fraudulently substituted for said ag:eenent another without con-
ditions: Held, that the subsequent fraud of the payee did not destroy
or impair the immunity which attached to commercial paper in the hands
of the bondfide holder : id.
Where a note provided for the payment of 11 attorney's fees of -
per cent. if suit be instituted on the note :" Irold, that the note was
payable with reasonable attorney's fhes, and that "of -  per cent.,"
was surplusage : d.
Fraud in Procuring Signatitre.- Carelessness of .faker.-Rights of
Innocent Endorsce.-Where the maker of a promissory note, negotiable
and payable at a bank in this state, was induced by the fraud and cir-
cumvention of the payee to sign his name to such note when he honestly
supposed and believed that he was executing a paper of an entirely dif"
fereut character, and had no intention to sign a note : Held, that the
maker was liable to a bonifide endorsee for value, if he was guilty of
negligence in fiiling to use reasonable care to inform himself of the con-
tents of the paper so signed by him: Nebeker et al. v. Cutsinger et al.,
48 Ind.
When a man, who can without difficulty read, executes a negotiable
note without reading it, trusting to the party to whom it is executed for
a statement of its contents, or trusting to the reading of it by the latter.
there being no substantial reasons shown for not reading it himself, he
is guilty of negligence: IM.
.lXaterial Alteration.-Suit on a promissory note, payable in a bank in
this state six months after date, or before if made out of the sales of
certain machines named, and having a condition annexed thereto that
the same was not to be paid if sales of said machines were not made
equal to the amount of the note within the time limited for the pay-
ment thereof: _ield, that if, after signing and delivery, without the
knowledge or consent of the maker, the condition was taken from the
note, this was a material alteration : Cochran et al. v. Nebeker et al.,
48 Ind.
The fact that such promissory note was payable at a bank in this
state did not make the maker liable upon it, as thus altered, in an ac-
tion thereon by an endorsee : 11.
When an instrument is altered after its execution, it will be presumed,
until the contrary is shown, that the alteration was made by the party
claiming under it, or by one under whom he claims; and it is not ne-
cessary, in an answer setting up that an instrument sued on has been
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altered, to allege that it was altered by the party claiming under it, or
by one under whoi lie claims: 1.
When the signing and delivery of an instrument, sued on are admitted,
but it is chimed in answer that it has beeu altered in a material part,
the burden is on the defcndant to prove its material alteration : id.
CHURCH. See Egti.
COM3MON CARRIER.
Resldpient of Freightt.-A common carrier who undertook to trans-
port freight by steamer to a designated point, but terminated his voyage
at an intermediate port, and reshipped such freight on the steamer of
another carrier, was liable to the owner fur the loss, where the second
carrier could not find the consignee at the place where the freight was
to be delivered, and, because there was no safe place of storage there,
returned it to the port where the reshipment was made, and there stored
it in a proper warehouse, which with the freight, was soon after acci-
dentally destroyed by fire: The Green, &c., Co. v. Aa'shall, 48 Ind.
When a delivery cannot be made at the point of destination, such
prudent care of the goods and their diligent and safe delivery, with
notice to the consignee or owner, as best comports with the interests of
the owner, according to the circumstances, will excuse the carrier; but
it devolves on the carrier to allege and prove such matter of excuse: d.
Excelption to Liability of.-The strict rule of the carrier's responsi-
bility as an iniurer is subject to the important qualification, that if the
owner of the goods is guilty of any fraud or imposition in respect to the
carrier as by concealing their nature or value, or where lie deceives the
carrier by his own carelessness in treating the parcel as a thing of no
value, li cannot hold tle carrier liable for the loss of the goods : ( &
A. Rlailroad Co. v. Sitea, 66 Ills.
CONTRACT.
Against Pablic Policy.-A contract, by one physician with another,
whereby the latter takes the office of the former for a given term, and
is to practise medicine in the name of the former, to personate him
when applied to by patients requiring medical treatment, and to prescribe
for them in his name, is contrary to public policy and will not be en-
forced : Jerome v. Bigelow, 66 Ills.
COVENANT. See Easement; Vendor.
CRIIINAL LAW. See Evdence.
Jrarder-Eovidence.-When two persons are murdered at the same
time and place, under circumstances evidencing that both murders were
committed by the same person, and were part of the same transaction,
&c., evidence as to the circumstances of the murder of one is admissi-
ble on the trial for the murder of the other : Brown v. Commonwealth,
76 Pa.
On a trial for murder, there was evidence that the defendant had in
his possession coin at a time when specie payments were suspended;
that the murdered man was living in a place where there wlhs no safe
deposit for money; under these circumstances evidence was admissible
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that the murdered man had received a quantity of coin, although several
years before: Id.
In order to establish identity, evidence that the witness gave testi-
mony in a prosecution against prisoner for another murder, and that he
recognised him as the person from whom he purchased coin the morn-
ing after the murder, was properly admitted without producing the
record of the prosecution : Id.
A prisoner confined in the jail with the defendant, testified that he
held a conversation with the defendant through the soil-pipes, in which
defendant confessed his guilt, and that the witness knew it was the de-
fendant from his voice. field, that the testimony was admissible ; its
weight was for the jury: Id.
The court charged the jury, that they might acquit the prisoner or
find him guilty of murder in the first or second degree, and state the
degree in their verdict. field, that it was not error to omit instructing
the jury on the subject of manslaughter, no instruction having been
asked as to that: Id.
It is not error in the court to omit instructing a jury on the abstract
principle, that on an indictment for murder, there may be a conviction
for manslaughter: .d.
CUSTOM.
Coextensive with State.-No particular custom, unless it is coexten-
sive with the state, should be allowed to affect a general law: Spears et
al. v. Ward et al., 48 Ind.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Assignment for Benefit of Credtors.-Middleton, the owner of iron-
works, being hopelessly insolvent, by deed reciting that by an assign-
ment for his creditors, or by proceedings in bankruptcy, his creditors,
except mortgage-creditors, could not hope to receive anything from his
estate, but believing that if his creditors would take his ironworks, &c.,
and work them, his debts might be paid, &a., transferred all his estate to
Light and his successors who might be elected by his creditors, in trust
to carry on the ironworks, and manufacture and sell the iron so long as
the creditors might determine it to be their interest to do so, and until
the debts should be paid, and when the creditors should determine, to
convert the estate into money and distribute it amongst them, &c. The
trustee took the estate under the deed, advanced money and made a
large quantity of iron at the furnaces of the assignor. Hfleld, that this
being the product of the capital and labor of the trustee, a judgment-
creditor of the assignor, who did not assent to the arrangement, could
not seize the iron so made on an execution on his judgment: Peters v.
Light et al., 76 Pa.
The property assigned enured to the benefit of all the creditors, in
proportion to their claims, which would not be invalidated by any at-
tempted preference : Id.
The stipulation that the trustees should manufacture iron so long as
the creditors should determine it was their interest to do so, was void
as against non-dssenting creditors : Id.
Such stipulation did not hinder or delay creditors; they could sell
the assigned property as if the assignment had not been made : Id.
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EASEMENT.
1'ater 1"rieilege.-If a miller purchase a water privilege, or portion
of water-power, without any portion of the bed of the stream, he will
gain an incorporeal hcreditanent or easement. And the capacity of
covenants in a deed to run with incorporeal hereditanients is the same
as it is with those which are corporeal : Sterling I12d'anllic Co. v. Vil-
lhams, 66 Ills.
EQUITY.
IJlunctionl to restrabi the T'astor qf a Church from offciating.-Upon
a bill filed by the trustees of an independent church to restrain their
pastor from longer officiating as such, it appeared that one of the cus-
toms of the chuich was to elect a pastor every year, and the defendant
had several time been so elected, and at the last election by the church
and society voting together. After this election the church session
and the trustees decided not to retain him ; they claiming that they had
the sole power to employ a pastor, bat the latter refused to leave.
JIM, that the facts and circumstances were not such as to justify the
interference of a court of equity, it appearing that the pastor remained
in obedience to the vote of the majority of the society, whose wishes,
accordin.g to the usages of the church, should control : Trustees of Inde-
pendent 1"es. 0/turch v. 1'"octor, 66 Ills.
ESTOPD En.
By Pleadings.-Where a defendant of full age, by the pleadings ex-
pressly or by implication assents to the execution of a contract as set out
in the bill, the court may give effect to such consent by its decree,
and such defendant will not be permitted to retract the assent upon
error, or insist the contract was not as set out: C-onZ v. AIrumlie, 66
Ills.
EVIDENCE.
Photograph.-On the trial ofan indictment for the murder of" Goss
alias Wilson," a photograph of (oss. testified to be like a mutilated body
found, was evidence to be submitted to the jury, that the body was that
of Goss: Ucterzook v. The Commoni ealth, 76 Pa.
Photography is to be judicially recognised as a proper means of pro-
ducing correct likenesses : I1.
A mutilated body, whose face was discolored and swollen, was found,
having been buried apparently for some days ; the witness who found
it had never seen the person before. Ile might testify that the face
resembled a photograph of a person alleged to be the one found; the
question whether the witness could identify it, whts for the jury: d.
Goss having been a man in the habit of becoming intoxicated, proof
that a man called "Wilson" had the same habits was evidence for the
jury on the question as to Wilson and Goss being the same person : Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OP. See .H.usband and "I' fe; Partnership.
,S'le of Good-will-Agreement vot to carry on same Business.-An
agreement by the lessor to let the lessee have the good-will of a business,
and that the lessor will abstain from carrying on a like business in the
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same locality for a period of five years, is within the Statute of Frauds,
and voidable if not in writing: Gottschalk v, Witter, 25 Ohio.
Where a lessee brought his action on such an agreement, seeking to
enjoin the lessor from its violation, and to recover damages for its
breach, and upon demurrer to a plea by the lessor that the agreement
was not in writing, and therefore void, the court. on hearing, overruled
the demurrer, and dismissed the petition : Held, that this action and
proceeding were no bar to a future action by the lessee to rescind the
contract, and recover back the consideration given for the agreement
Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
ife's Separate Deed void.-A wife made a deed for real estate which
she owned, her husband not joining in it; his consent, not given in the
manner and form required by the statute, was of no effect, and after her
death he could recover the land as tenant by the curtesy: Houck et al.
v. Ritter, 76 Pa.
Evidence that the grantee of the wife held a note against the hus-
band, which was given to her as the consideration for the land, was in-
admissible in ejectment for the land by the husband after the wife's
death : Id.
Statute of Frauds.- Contract in consideration of Marriage.-A. wife
obtained a divorce from her husband and also a judgment for alimony.
Afterward the parties remarried, the judgment being unpaid. They
were again divorced, and alimony was granted the wife a second time.
The husband, after the second divorce, filed his complaint to enjoin the
collection of the first judgment, on the grounds, first, that the judgment
plaintiff agreed, in consideration that he would remarry her, she would
release said judgment; second, that the judgment was satisfied by the
second judgment for alimony, the court having then made a thorough
investigation of his ability to pay. Held, that the promise to release
the first judgment in consideration of the remarriage was void by the
Statute of Frauds, because not in writing. Held, also, that there was
nothing in the second ground inconsistent with the idea that the defend-
ant was liable upon the first judgment: Brenner v. Brenner et al., 48
Ind.
INSURANCE.
Fire by Co~lision-Barratry.--A policy of insurance on a steamboat
against loss by fire only, covers a loss by fire caused by collision where
collision is not excepted, by the terms of the policy, from the risk
named: Germania A1s. Co. v. Sherlock, 25 Ohio.
Where the conduct of a pilot results in injury to the owner of the
vessel, but is free from fraud, gross negligentce, and wilful violation of a
known positive law, he is not guilty of barratry within the rule of mari-
time or insurance law : Id.
Total Loss-Negligence.-Where a steamboat, injured at or near its
home port by a peril insured against, remains in specie, the assured
cannot, without abandoning the vessel to the underwriter, claim indem-
nity as for a total luss, although the cost of repairing the vessel may ex-
ceed its value when repaired : lobe Ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 25 Ohio.
The rule that an insurer who has paid the loss resulting from a peril
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insured against, may be subrogated to all the claims which the insured
may have against any person by whose negligence the injury was caused,
does not apply in a case where the injury was caused by the negligence
of the insured himself. But if the loss was caused by the wilful or
fraudulent act of the insured, the same may be set up as a defence to an
action on the policy, whether the subject of the insurance has been
abandoned to the insurer or not: Id.
JUDGMENT.
aJrisdiction--Civil War.-The existence of the late civil war and the
President's proclamation issued in pursuance of an Act of Congress,
prohibiting all commercial intercourse between the citizens of the rebel-
lious and those of the loyal states, did not suspend the operation of our
statutes authorizing the prosecution of suits against non-resident defend-
ants domiciled in the rebellious states, in respect to their property situ-
ate in this state, by publication of notice, so as to deprive the courts in
such cases of all jurisdiction : S emour v. Bailey, 66 Ills.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Lease on Shares.-In the case of a leasing for a share of the crops
raised, to be divided after the same is gathered, the title to the whole
of the crop raised will be that of the tenant until divided and possession
given ; and after the levy of an execution against the tenant, an agree-
nient between him and the landlord that the latter shall receive his
share in the field, will not be allowed to defeat the levy, nor give the
landlord- the right to maintain replevin : Sargent v. Courrier, 66 Ills.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Suspension by War.-The fact of inaccessibility or inability to sue
seems to be the true reason why statutes of limitation are suspended
during a time of war. The disability to sue which attaches to the char-
acter of alien enemy, continues only while the party is abiding in his
own country. Therefore, if a party residing in a seceding state at the
commencement of the late hostilities, should voluntarily leave his state
and go into a foreign state or come to this state, it would seem that his
disability to sue would cease : Seymour v. Bailey, 66 Ills.
. NEGLIGENCE. See Railroad.
Pysician.-Meglect of Orders by Patient.-A surgeon assumes to exer-
cise the ordinary care and skill of his profession, and is liable for in-
juries resulting from his failure to do so ; yet if his patient neglects to
obey the reasonable instructions of the surgeon, and thereby contributes
to the injury complained of, he cannot recover for such injury: Geisel-
man v. Scott, 25 Ohio.
The information given by a surgeon to his patient concerning the
nature of his malady, is a circumstance that should be considered in
determining whether the patient, in disobeying the instructions of the
surgeon, was guilty of contributory negligence or not : Id.
.Failure to keep Stream clear.-Backing Mter on Neigh bor.-Plain-
tiff owned land above defendants' dam, which ordinarily did not back
the water on plaintiff's land ; in latter years a peculiar grass commenced
growing in this dam about February of each year, which obstructed the
VOL. XXIII.-74
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water, and in consequence it flowed back on plaintiff's land ; about June
the grass broke off and ceased to impede the current. The court below
charged that if accumulations of dirt, &c., in the dam caused the growth
of the grass, the defendants would be liable as if the obstruction had
been caused by dirt, &e., alone; but if the grass twould have grown to
the same extent and caused the same injury, &c., in the channel if there
had been no dam or accumulation of dirt, &c., he would not be liable.
Held, to be correct : Knoll v. Light et a.L, 76 Penn.
If the growt.h of the grass was not occasioned by any act or negli-
gence of the defendants, and was the result of natural causes over
which he had no control, he would not be liable for injury therefrom to
the plaintiff, although the obstruction was on the defendants' own land:
Id.
There is no liability for an injury arising from natural causes or an
act of Providence, if there be no concurring negligence : Id.
The plaintiff, if injured by the grass, had the right to enter upon de-
fendants' land and remove it : Id.
NUISANCE. See _Aegligence.
Remedy in Equity-Separate Plintiffs-Acguiescence--Similar Nid-
sauces in Vichity.-The complainants, being nineteen separate owners
and occupants of valuable residences in a small specified district in
Detroit, substantially used for dwellings, united in a complaint against
defendant in which they maintained that he uses certain premises he oc-
cupies near by, on Woodbridge street, in such manner as to be a nuisance,
and specially and greatly injurious to them in property, comfort and
health. His business was that of forging, and the nuisance complained
of was the smoke and soot from bituminous coal and the noise and jar
caused by the use of a heavy steam-hammer. Complainants prayed for
an injunction, which was decreed by the court below. It was objected
that the case is not rightly constituted, since the complainants are sepa-
rate owners with distinct property interests, but it should be brought
by the attorney-general. Held, That this objection is not maintainable;
that the rights asserted are alike, and the grievance complained of has
one source and operates in the same general manner against the rights
of all the complainants, and to sustain this objection would be to sacrifice
substance to useless form : Robinson et al. v. Bazitgh, S. C. Mich.
It was objected that the bill should have been verified by oath. Held,
That as the bill was framed only as a mere pleading, and not for use in
obtaining a preliminary injunction, the only relief contemplated being
such as would be granted on final hearing, no verification of it was re-
q uired : 1d.
It was insisted that a trial at law was a necessary prerequisite before a
suit in equity could be brought. Held, That this position is not correct ;
that the statutes (Comp. L. § 6377) giving jurisdiction in equity in
matters concerning nuisances, confer it in all cases where there is not
a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, and that no adequate
remedy at law exists for such a grievance as this : 11.
Defendant also urged that some of the complainants had establishments
near by which were liable to objections similar to those made against his,
and that he, therefore, ought not to be enjoined at their instance.
Held, That, assuming the fact to be as supposed, it affords no valid
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excuse for him ; it neither lessens his wrong nor disables the com-
plainants from making legal complaint of it.
It was urged that complainants had so far acquiesced in defendant's
operations as to preclude them from enjoining him. HTeld, That as his
operations which were objected to were only commenced two years before
the suit, and the large hammer was not purchased until a year later, and
complaint was made to the common council and to defendant personally
before suit, this point was not sustainable : Id.
It was also specified, as a ground of defence, that there were several
other establishments in the vicinity, which were specified, that were
claimed to be as detrimental as that of defendant. Held, That this is no
excuse for defendant; that where nuisances are maintained by separate
owners they must be proceeded against separately, and that it is of no
legal consequence that prosecution is carried on against only one at a
time: Id.
OFFICER. See Arbitration.
PARENT AND CHILD. See .Assumpsit.
PARTNERSHIP.
Contract.-Statute of M-auds.-A parol agreement, made by one who
has purchased the interest of a partner in the partnership property, to
pay. as a part of the consideration for the property purchased, one-half
of the debts of the old partnership, may be enforced against such pur-
chaser by the holder of a note made by.the members of the old firm.
Such agreement is not within the Statute of Frauds : Haggerty v. John-
ston, 48 Ind.
Death of one.-The death of a partner is i'pso facto, from the time of
the death a dissolution of the partnership, however numerous the asso-
ciation may be. But a community of interest still exists between the
survivors and the representatives of the deceased partner, and the latter
have a right to insist on the application of the joint property to the pay-
ment of the joint debts, and a due distribution of the surplus. So long as
these objects remain to be accomplished, the partnership may be con-
sidered as having a limited continuance: Nelson v. Hayner, 66 Ills.
In equity the surviving partners are treated as trustees, with the fidu-
ciary relation existing between them and the representatives of the
deceased partner, of trustees to cestuis quo trust. If the surviving
partner does not account in a reasonable time, a court of chancery, will
grant an injunction to restrain him from acting, and appoint a receiver
and direct the account to be taken : Rd.
Grounds for dissolving.-It is not for every act of misconduct on the
part of one partner that a court of equity, at the instance of the other,
will dissolve the partnership and close up the affairs bf the company:
Cash v. Earnshaw, 66 Ills.
To justify such an extraordinary interposition a strong and clear case
must be made out of positive and meditated abuse. For minor miscon-
duct or grievances involving no permanent mischief, a Court of Equity
will ordinarily go no further than to act upon the faulty partner by
way of injunction. The fact of loss occurring to the firm through mere
.error of judgment of the partner is not sufficient cause for a dissolution
of the partnership: Id.
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Negotiable Paper in Firm A.ame-Presumption of Partner's .Author-
it -Burden of Proof.-Cameron sued plaintiffs in error on two promis-
sory notes signed John Carrier & Co. The declaration counted specially
on each note, and also contained the general counts with copies of the
notes. Each special count averred that the defendants were copartners
doing business under the firm name of John Carrier & Co. The plea
was the general issue, and an affidavit of John Carrier was filed and
served to preclude its being taken as admitted that the notes were
firm transactions or obligatory upon any one but the signer himself. The
first question presented is whether the plaintiff was required, in order
to make out a primfl facie case to show in the outset that Carrier had ex-
press authority to make notes generally or to make the notes in suit in
the firm name, or that the copartnership was of the class in respect to
which such authority is presumed, or that its course of business had
been such as to imply authority, or that the signing by Carrier had been
approved or ratified. Held, that when a member of a firm gives a note
in the firm name the presumption is that it is given, for a partnership
purpose, and the burden of proof is on the copartnership to show the
contrary; that a plaintiff is not required in the first instance, in order
to maintain his part of the issue on a count setting up an express con-
tract, to give express evidence of matters neither alleged nor required
to be alleged in the count, and that in a count by an endorsee against
copartnership makers it is not necessary to specially allege the capacity
of the firm to make notes, or to set firth specifically a state of facts
which would seem to imply it: Carrier et al. v. Cameron, S. C. Mich.
After the plaintiff had proved the existence of the firm, that Carrier
belonged to it and had signed the notes.and delivered them to one Cor-
bit, who had endorsed them to plaintiff, and that plaintiff was owner of
them, and had shown how much was due on them, the defendants
offered to prove that Carrier gave the notes for money borrowed for him-
self, for his own private use, and that Corbit loaned him the money and
knew the facts, and that the other members of his firm knew nothing
about their being given or ever sanctioned or approved it, and that Car-
rier signed the firm name without authority, but the court below, after
asking if it was proposed to show that Cameron had notice of these facts,
and reply being made in the negative, and that they did not know
whether Cameron had knowledge or not, ru ed out the offered evidence.
Held, that this was error; that it was certainly competent for the de-
fendants to show that the notes were fraudulent in their inception, as
against the copartnership, and that the payee not only knew this, but
was actually a partner to the fraud, and the offer went to that extent;
that if the offered evidence had been given, the inference from it would
have been that Cameron gave no value andi was not a bond fide holder,
and it would then have been incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish
his right to recover, to show that he had in fact given value for the
notes and was in the position of a bond fide holder: Id.
PATENT. See Bills and. Notes.
PHOTOGRAPHY. See Evidence.
PHYSICIAN. See Contract; Negligence.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
RAILROAD.
Passenger.-Ejection qf.-Where all the seats in one of two passenger
cars are already filled with passengers, another passenger has no right to
demand a seat in that particular ear, and to refuse to pay his fare or
deliver his ticket unless furnished a seat in such car; and if he refuses,
under such circumstances, to deliver his ticket or pay his fare, the per-
sons in charge of the train may rightfully eject him therefrom : Pts-
buigh, &c., Railroad Co. v. Iran llouten, 48 Ind.
When a passenger, because not furnished a seat in a railroad car al-
ready filled with passengers, abused the conductor in a violent manner and
with profane language, and struck said conductor in a violent and angry
manner, without any excuse whatever, and on account of such miscon-
duct, and his refusal to pay his fire or deliver his ticket, the passenger
was ejected from the train : Held, that such ejection was justifiable:
i.
Contributory Negligence-Cattlc killed in City-Fencc.-It is negli-
gence in the owner of cattle to allow them to run at large in a city,
where a railroad is not required to be fenced; and by reason of such
contributory negligence, he cannot recover for cattle killed by trains
of a railroad company at such place, when the company is guilty of
negligence only; otherwise, where the cattle are wilfully killed: J.,
A. & I. Railroad Co. v. Underhill, 48 Ind.
Aregligence- jur.y by Fire.-Tn an action against a railroad company,
where the complaint charges that the defendant, while running its lo-
comotive and train of cars adjoining the plaintiff's premises, negligently
set fire to said premises from sparks and coals of fire from said engine,
and burned certain rails, &c., it is competent for the plaintiff to prove,
as tending to show negligence, that the sides of the railroad track at
the point of the fire had dry rubbish, logs and grass thereon : T., W.
W. Railway Co. v. Wand, 48 Ind.
Under such complaint it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show
that his premises were first ignited ; it is sufficient if combustible ma-
terial on the railroad track was first ignited, the natural tendency of
which was to conduct the fire to the adjoining premises of the plaintiff:
id.
A locomotive may be properly equipped with spark-arresters, and yet
have other defects by which it may set fire to adjoining premises, or it
may be operated with reasonable care and diligence in refbrence to the
road itself, and yet run among combustible rubbish and thus commu-
nicate fire to the adjoining premises: Md.
Failure to ring the Bell.-In an. action on the case against a railway
company to recover for a personal injury, the court instructed the jury
that if plaintiff was injured by one of defendant's engines at a street
crossing, in the city of Peoria, and at the time there was no bell ringing
or whistle sounding upon such engine, they should find for the plain-
tiff, unless he, by his own negligence, materially contributed to the
injury: Held, that the instruction should have left it to the jury to find
whether the plaintiff was injured by reason of such omission of duty,
and without this it was fatally defective: 0. B. & Q. Railroad Co.
v. Notzki, 66 Ills.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
STREAM. See Easement; .- egligence.
STREET.
Agreement to dedicate.-Acceptance by P1 blc.-Where the proprie-
tors of adjacent lands agreed that each would appropriate from his land
a strip to be used in common for a public street, and conveyances and
improvements have been made on the faith, that the street would be
opened, the agreement may be enforced in equity, whether the public
authorities accept the street as dedicated to public use or not : Seegar
v. Harrison, 25 Ohio.
The grantee in a deed, which describes the premises conveyed as
bounded on a street named, is bound to take notice of the existence of
such street; and he is chargeable with such knowledge as to the loca-
tion of the street as he could have obtained by reasonable inquiry : Pd.
SUBROGATION. See Insurance.
TORT. See Assumpsit.
Election of Remed.-Sait i& Contract is 1Waicer of Tort.-Subse-
quent Suit for same Cause of Action.-This was an action of case for
enticing away and harboring plaintiff's minor son nineteen years old.
The evidence went to show that the parties having been near neighbors
in Cooper, Kalamazoo county, defendant moved to Missouri, and with-
out plaintiff's knowledge or consent and against his wishes persuaded
and induced the young man to leave his father and go to defendant's
place in Missouri and there work for the latter on his promise of wages.
In defence it was shown that the plaintiff had before sued defendant in
assumpsit before a justice to recover on the basis of contract for the
minor's services; tiat the cause was brought to trial before a jury and
a hearing had upon the merits : that the jury disagreed and the cause
was discontinued and this suit brought, and this was claimed to be a
decisive election by the plaintiff to treat the transaction as one of con-
tract and not tort, which precluded him from afterward counting upon
it as a tortious act. The court below charged the jury in effect that it
was competent for the plaintiff to ignore the tort and to treat the trans-
action as one of contract between the parties to be enforced agreeably to
its nature ; and that if the plaintiff, with full knowledge of all the ficts,
had elected to place his right on that basis, and had prosecuted a suit
on that theory and foundation down to the submission of the case to a
jury, he could not afterwards turn round and repudiate such election
and maintain a suit in tort. The jury found for defendant and plaintiff
brings error. ilehl, That a man may not take contradictory positions,
and where he has a right to choose one of two modes of redress, and the
two are so inconsistent that the assertion of one involves the negation
or repudiation of the other, his deliberate and settled choice of one with
knowledge, or the means of knowledge, of such facts as would authorize
a resort to either, will preclude him thereafter from going back and
electing again : Thompson v. Hfoward, S. 0. Mich.
.eld,further, That as there was no evidence or claim that the par-
ties ever actually agreed together at all in regard to the minor's ser-
vices, it was not possible to refer the assumpsit to any real agreement
of a date later than that of the alleged wrongful enticement, and not
possible to infer that the assunisit rested on a distinct arrangeu,ent
